CHRIS SMEENK

My research focuses on scientific method and the structure of our knowledge in physics: what is the structure and content of physical theories, how are theories evaluated and justified, and how are they extended and refined? I have tackled these general issues through the detailed study of space-time physics, focusing primarily on episodes of significant theory change ranging from Newton’s Principia to contemporary cosmology. My work also addresses an important topic that has not received much attention from philosophers of science, namely the status of “hybrid theories” — theories combining aspects of two incompatible theories, used in lieu of an as yet undiscovered theory successfully combining them. In approaching these topics, I aim to clarify the conceptual and evidential problems that have shaped research, and to understand methodological successes and failures. I have found it fruitful to address these questions based on careful study of the historical development of physics, by looking for common epistemic strategies and patterns of argument, and considering several distinctive cases of conceptual change and theory development. My background provides me with the necessary technical tools to understand and elucidate these problems. My research on these theories has allowed me to contribute to debates in the foundations of physics regarding their interpretation and content.

Two reasons motivate my approach to issues of scientific method and the structure of theories via studies of scientific practice. First, my interest in method is broader than topics typically treated in confirmation theory or inductive logic. To use Reichenbach’s terminology, my focus is not limited to the context of justification; there are, I argue, a number of important epistemological issues in the context of discovery. For example, one of Einstein’s most productive insights was based on a careful reconsideration of the structure of Newton’s theory. Einstein’s path to general relativity was guided in part by his recognition that the equality of inertial and gravitational mass undercuts the ability to distinguish empirically between inertial motion and motion due solely to gravity. This entails that several distinctions crucial to Newton’s theory are not well-founded. Einstein’s recognition of this problem within existing theory was an important insight guiding his discovery of a new theory. The use of hybrid theories is an important part of research in the context of discovery. In both early universe cosmology and the proofs of no-go theorems related to time machines, one of the main goals is to isolate results that are expected to carry over to the undiscovered theory of quantum gravity. In both these examples, it would be a mistake to treat epistemological issues as arising only when a finished theory has been produced, and to view the task of philosophers of science as limited to analyzing the empirical support of such finished theories.

Second, the epistemic problems addressed by physicists are closely tied to the content of specific theories, whereas deracinated versions of the same problems lose much of their vitality. For example, a common claim in general discussions of method is that the use of idealizations to represent phenomena undermines claims of truth.

This is a generalized form of a problem faced routinely by physicists, namely whether they have appropriate control over the idealizations appearing in a particular theory. However, the generalized version of the argument misses the fact that physicists have developed a number of sophisticated, arguably successful responses to this problem.

This is not to deny that there is a general “problem of idealization,” but rather to insist that there are many problems of idealization — and many different, theory-specific ways of handling them. Nor do I deny the importance of stepping back from an understanding of specific cases to discuss idealization more generally, but it seems to me implausible that reversing the order of inquiry would be as fruitful. I have found careful study of the (implicit or explicit) methodology of scientists like Newton and Einstein to be rich and illuminating, much more so than attempts to tackle methodological issues at an entirely general level.

Books:

PSA 2014: Contributed Papers (Volume 82, Dec. 2015) and Symposia (Volume 83, Dec.2016). Two special issues of Philosophy of Science, roughly 500 pages each, based on contributions to the Philosophy of Science Association Biennial meeting (2014). As Program Chair for the meeting,
I was also editor of the proceedings volumes.

“Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory,” special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42 (2011). Co-edited with Wayne Myrvold, with an editorial introduction, pp. 77-80.

The Genesis of General Relativity, assistant editor, with J. Renn, M. Schemmel, and C. Martin. Vol. III, Theories of Gravitation in the Twilight of Classical Physics; Vol. IV, Alternative Approaches to General Relativity. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 250. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. (2 volumes, 1,152 pages.)

Articles:

“Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives on the Cosmological Constant,” with Adam Koberinski and Bridget Falk. Universe 9 (2023): 134. DOI: doi.org/10.3390/universe9030134. Preprint: arXiv:2212.04335, 31 pages.

“What’s In a Survey? Simulation-Induced Selection Effects in Astronomy,” with Sarah Gallagher. In Philosophy of Astrophysics: Stars, Simulations, and the Struggle to Determine What is Out There, edited by Nora Boyd, Siska de Baerdemaeker, Kevin Heng, and Vera Matarese. Cham: Springer (2023). Preprint – arXiv:2302.10774.

“^ and the limits of Effective Field Theory,” with Adam Koberinski. Philosophy of Science 90 (2023): 454–474. DOI: doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.16), Preprint – Phil-sci: 20585.

“Noether’s first theorem and the energy-momentum tensor ambiguity problem,” with Mark Baker and Niels Linnemann. In The Philosophy and Physics of Noether’s Theorems, edited by James Read and Nicholas Teh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2022), pp. 169-196. Preprint – arXiv:2107.10329.

“The Trouble with Hubble: Status of the Big Bang Models.” Philosophy of Science 89, 1265–1274. DOI: doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.40.

“Determinism and General Relativity,” with Christian W¨ uthrich. Philosophy of Science 88 (2021): 638-664. Preprint – arXiv:2009.07555.

“Validating the Universe in a Box,” with Sarah Gallagher. Philosophy of Science 87 (2020): 1221–1233. Preprint – arXiv:2001.09101.

“Some Reflections on the Structure of Cosmological Knowledge.” Studies in the History and Philosophyof Modern Physics 71 (2020): 220-231.

“Q.E.D., QED,” with Adam Koberinski. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 71 (2020): 1-13.

“Gaining Access to the Early Universe,” in Why Trust Theory? Epistemology of Fundamental Physics, edited by R. Dawid, K. Thebault, and R. Dardashti. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2019), pp. 315-338.

“Philosophical Aspects of Cosmology,” in Oxford Handbook of the History of Modern Cosmology, edited by H. Kragh and M.S. Longair. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019), pp. 497-530.

“Inflation, Dark Matter, and Dark Energy,” with Malcolm Longair, in Oxford Handbook of the History of Modern Cosmology, edited by H. Kragh and M.S. Longair. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019), pp. 426-464.

“Inflation and the Origins of Structure,” in Beyond Einstein: Perspectives on Geometry, Gravitation, and Cosmology in the Twentieth Century, edited by D. Rowe, T. Sauer, and S. Walter. Einstein Studies (Volume 14), Boston: Springer (2018): pp. 205-241.

“The Cosmos As Involving Local Laws and Inconceivable without Them”, with Yann Ben´etreau-Dupin. The Monist (2017) 100 (3): 357-372.

“Testing Inflation,” in Philosophy of Cosmology, edited by K. Chamcham, J. D. Barrow, J. Silk and S. Saunders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2017), pp. 206-227.

“Philosophy of the Physical Sciences,” with Carl Hoefer. In Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Paul Humphreys. Oxford: Oxford University Press (published online 2015; in print Sept. 2016).

“Philosophical Geometers and Geometrical Philosophers,” in The Language of Nature: Reassessing the Mathematization of Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, edited by B. Hill, G. Gorham, and E. Slowik. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (2016), pp. 308-338.3

“Predictability crisis in early universe cosmology.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2014): 122-133.

“Newton’s Principia,” with Eric Schliesser. In Oxford Handbook for the History of Physics, edited by J. Buchwald and R. Fox. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2014), pp. 109-165.

“Einstein’s Role in the Creation of Relativistic Cosmology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Einstein, edited by M. Janssen and C. Lehner. Cambridge University Press (2014), pp. 228-269.

“Time in Cosmology,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Time, ed. by A. Bardon and H. Dyke. Oxford: Blackwell (2013), pp. 201-219.

“Philosophy of Cosmology,” in Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Physics, edited by R. Batterman. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 607-652.

“Cotes’ Queries: Newton’s Empiricism and Conceptions of Matter,” with Z. Biener. In Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays, edited by A. Janiak and E. Schliesser. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Pres (2012), pp. 105-137.

“Time Travel and Time Machines,” with C. W¨ uthrich. In Oxford Handbook on Time, edited by C. Callender. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 577-630.

“Mie’s Theories of Matter and Gravitation,” with C. Martin. In The Genesis of General Relativity, pp.623-632.

“Do the Laws of Physics Forbid the Operation of Time Machines?” (with J. Earman and C. Wüthrich). Synthese 169 (2009): 91-124.

“Mie’s Theories of Matter and Gravitation,” with C. Martin. In The Genesis of General Relativity, (2007), pp. 623-632.

“The Elusive Higgs Mechanism.” Philosophy of Science 73 (2006): 487-499.

“False Vacuum: Early Universe Cosmology and the Development of Inflation,” in The Universe of General Relativity, edited by J. Eisenstaedt and A. J. Kox, Einstein Studies Vol. 11, Boston: Birkhauser (2005), pp. 223-257.

“Pendulums, Pedagogy, and Matter: Lessons from the editing of Newton’s Principia,” with Zvi Biener. Science and Education 13 (2004): 309-320. Reprinted in Matthews, M., Gauld, C., and Stinner A. (eds.), The Pendulum: Scientific, Historical, Philosophical, and Educational Perspectives (2005), Dordrecht: Springer.

Invited Talks:

“In Search of Lost Spacetime,” invited colloquium speaker at the Perimeter Institute (May 10, 2023).

“Opacity and Understanding,” invited speaker at the Japanese – Canadian Frontiers of Science meeting, Banff (March 2023).

“Closing the Loop in Early Universe Cosmology?” University of Toronto, Astronomy Colloquium (March 2023).

“Fuzzy Modularity and Crucial Simulations,” with Marie Gueguen. Invited speaker at Bergen Annual Conference in Philosophy of Science, Bergen, Norway (Sept. 20-21, 2022).

“Aim and Structure of Cosmological Theory: The Early Universe,” Invited speaker at History and Philosophy of Cosmology conference (Milan, Italy; Sept. 13-17, 2022).

“Inflation: Beyond Semi-Classical Quantum Gravity,” invited speaker at Global Structure in Semi- Classical Gravity workshop, Munich (July 21, 2022).
IT69. “Gravitational Energy and Background Structure,” invited colloquium in the Lichtenberg History and Philosophy of Science Seminar, Bonn (July 5, 2022).

Invited lecturer at Beyond Spacetime Summer School, Morzine (June 2022).

“Observational Cosmology in the 1960’s,” invited symposium at the American Physical Society, History of Physics Forum. Organized by Smeenk; co-symposiasts Jim Peebles and Dennis Lehmkuhl. New York City (April 9, 2022).

“Eliminative Reasoning and its Limits,” philosophy departmental colloquium, Western (April 30, 2021); CU Boulder, Committee on History and Philosophy of Science, invited colloquium (March 11, 2022); Stockholm, Workshop on Theory Confirmation (May 5, 2022).

“Cosmological Constants,” Kinds of Constants virtual workshop organized by Alistair Isaac, University of Edinburgh (April 9, 2021).

“Decoupling from the Initial State?,” in the Cosmology Beyond Spacetime virtual seminar series, University of Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science (March 3, 2021).

“Censorship and the Limits of GR,” Black Hole Institute, Harvard, colloquium (Feb. 25, 2020).

“Explaining the Initial State?” NYU Abu Dhabi Conference on Foundations of Cosmology and Quantum Gravity, invited speaker (Jan. 18, 2020).
IT61. “General Relativity Stands Alone?” McGill Space Institute,

Conference Presentations:

“What is a Higgs Boson?,” paper given in symposium “The Higgs, Goldstone, and the LHC,’” at the European Philosophy of Science Association Conference. Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. October 2009. Also given at University of Wuppertal, to a seminar meeting of the research group, “Epistemology of the Large Hadronic Collider,” March 2010.

“Fine-Tuning Problems and Early Universe Cosmology,” UWO and Caltech. January 2007. “Gravitational Energy and Substantivalism.” Second Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime. Montreal, June 2006.

“Alternatives in Early Universe Cosmology.” Seventh International Conference on the History of General Relativity. Tenerife, March 2005.

“Causation and Gravitation.” UCLA conference in History and Philosophy of Science, Nov. 2004. Conference co-chair.