Daniel Bjorklund

 Daniel Bjorklund headshot

Daniel Bjorklund, BA, MA, is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Western University.

His research interests center on defining what a mind is, with a particular focus on intentionality, consciousness, the mind-body problem, and mental representation. Drawing on a background in strategic communication and computer science, he also investigates the potential implications for ethics, law, and policy. His dissertation evaluates two-tiered theories of intentionality, arguing that they are incompatible with the common-sense understanding of the mind. 

Connect with him at dbjorklu@uwo.ca. 

 


 

Tell us a little about your current research. What questions or problems are you interested in?

Everyone seems to agree that humans think while machines (such as LLMs) merely calculate. This is true despite machines repeatedly proving capable of performing tasks that we previously considered uniquely mental, including doing math, producing art, and using language. In many cases, it seems like all you need is an algorithm and some data to replicate everything we do. Even so, it just seems obvious to us that we and our fellow animals have something special going on in our heads that LLMs and other machines can’t yet do.  

What we haven’t yet figured out is what that special ingredient might be. This is troubling because it means that we can’t quite be sure where the border between mental and non-mental goes, which could lead to a great deal of harm. If we fail to recognize a mind where there is one, we might gravely mistreat a thinking and feeling being. If we wrongly see a mind where there is none, we might waste already limited care and resources that should go towards real minds. 

I am currently working to evaluate one such proposed “special ingredient” which might mark the difference. 

 

How does your research connect to issues or challenges outside of academia?

Our understanding of what counts as a person is largely tied to what we think counts as a mind. Finding a way to definitively identify the mental therefore stands to have wide-reaching ethical, legal, and social implications. 

For example, other lifeforms are a complicated gray area. On one hand, certain animals seem to obviously have minds and therefore deserve some sort of consideration. Others, however, are less obvious. Do ants have minds? Do plants? Do clams? Do bacteria? Assuming we want to avoid cruelty, we should figure out how to identify minds so that we can ensure they do not suffer. 

There is also a growing concern that AIs might possess mental features, either now or in the near future. If they do, our treatment of them ought to change drastically. However, until we have some certainty about what the special ingredient is, we can’t be sure what to do. 

On the flipside, LLMs threaten to devalue human abilities and effort through replication and theft. A sure-fire way to identify true mental processes might allow us to better prevent the financial and emotional harms that follow.  

 

Why are you interested in exploring a research partnership with a not-for-profit, public-sector organization, or industry partner?

Questions surrounding what a mind is and what it could look like are becoming more and more pressing. We risk mistreating animals, humans, and possibly artificial beings with our current systems. 

By working with non-academic partners, I hope to gain greater insight into how the abstract theories under development might be implemented such that they actually help prevent harm.   

 

What experiences have equipped you to contribute to a collaborative research project?

As a philosopher, I am highly trained in examining the fundamental assumptions of methodologies and claims. This allows me to bring precision and clarity to the debate at hand, which can help me foresee procedural problems before they arise or provide insights into promising research directions. I have done so already for academic collaborative research projects, for example in my trainee role with a Rotman Interdisciplinary Think Tank called “Is Law Exceptional?”.  

Through my teaching experience and bachelor’s degree in strategic communication, I am also well versed in translating information across a range of registers. I am therefore confident that I can help ensure smooth cross-disciplinary communication.  

In terms of area expertise, I am most well versed in Philosophy of Mind, which broadly encompasses questions about what a mind or consciousness is and where meaning comes from. I am familiar with several nearby fields, including psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and neuroscience as well, especially as they relate to my research. 

 

What is one thing you wish more organizations knew about the kind of research you do? 

I think that the philosophical method and its value is gravely misunderstood and underappreciated, which is something I’d like to help fix. For example, the invention of the computer in the 1930s was only made possible by the efforts of philosophers who, decades or centuries prior, systematized logic such that it could later be mechanized. The value of philosophical work is not always immediately apparent, but its influence can often be felt widely and for a long time afterwards.